AIRPROX REPORT No 2012025

Date/Time:	26 Feb 2012 1359Z (Sunday)	
Position:	5115N 00113W (3nm N Popham - elev 550ft)	
Airspace:	Lon FIR	(*Class: G*)
	Reporting Ac	*Reporting Ac*
Type:	Jodel D105	PA28
Operator:	Civ Pte	Civ Pte
Alt/FL:	2200ft QNH (1029hPa)	2200ft QNH (1027hPa)
Weather:	VMC CLBC	VMC
Visibility:	10nm	NK
Reported Separation:	10ft V/0m H	200ft V/0m H
Recorded Separation:	NR V/<0.1nm H	



BOTH PILOTS FILED

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

THE JODEL D105 PILOT reports flying solo in a white ac with black stripes and no lighting, on a VFR private flight. He was in a level cruise, about 5nm N and inbound to Popham, heading 180° at 90kt in receipt of an A/G service and was squawking 7000 with Mode C but TCAS was not fitted when he suddenly became aware of blue and white single-engine low-wing ac, about 100m away in his 2 o'clock and about the same level. At the time he thought it was at the same height but with hindsight he thought it may have been slightly above him. He immediately dived and saw the ac pass directly above him and then continue straight and level. He thought that the other pilot did not see his ac, assessed the risk to be high and reported the incident on landing.

THE PA28 PILOT reports flying a blue, white and gold ac on a private flight to Maypole Farm (Kent). When just to the W of Basingstoke he was in the process of changing frequency from Thruxton to Farnborough requesting a BS when he had an Airprox with a Robin or Jodel ac. He had no warning of any ac in close proximity on his PCAS and no indication from ATC of any ac in close proximity.

They were approaching the Farnborough Zone with the intention of following the railway to the N of Farnborough in order to keep clear of their airspace and he was keeping a constant lookout ahead (out-of-sun) and to both sides of the ac through a more or less 180° arc in near perfect flying conditions.

It was a relatively busy afternoon and there was the possibility of gliding activity in the area, of which ATC had warned him, and he thought was NOTAMed, in addition to other ac. The first time he saw the other ac was when it appeared below in close proximity from a NW'ly direction – probably separated by around 300ft laterally and 200ft below and coming from their rear at an angle of around 140°.

Given the angle from the rear from which the ac came, the only way he could have spotted it earlier would have been for him to have turned and actually been 'looking at an angle to the rear'. From the angle the other ac came however, they should have been visible [to its pilot] from a considerable

distance, particularly given the visibility on the day and avoidance action could and should have been taken by the other pilot.

His initial reaction, apart from anger and alarm, was that he would file an Airprox report himself but pressure of work initially prevented him from doing so.

Also he thought that the other ac had most likely not been using a transponder as there was no warning of him on his PCAS and he considered that identifying the other ac would be difficult so there was no urgency to making his report.

It was a close encounter and one which he considers could and should have been avoided had the other pilot been keeping a good look out.

ATSI reports that the Airprox occurred at 1358:40, in Class G airspace, 2.7nm N of Popham Airfield, between a Jodel DR105A (DR105) on a VFR flight from Hinton in the Hedges to Popham (EGPO), and a Piper PA-28R-200 Cherokee Arrow (PA28) on a VFR flight from Thruxton (EGHO) to Maypole (EGHB).

CAA ATSI had access to Farnborough RT and area radar recordings together with written reports from both pilots and the FPS for the PA28 provided by Farnborough. Both ac were equipped with Mode S.

The Farnborough Weather was:

> METAR EGLF 261350Z 240/5KT 210V360 9999 FEW029 11/05 Q1028=

At 1355:50, radar recording shows the distance between the two ac was 8.6nm on converging headings. The DR105 is shown, 7.1nm N of Popham, squawking 7000 without Mode C level reporting, tracking S. The DR105 pilot's report indicated that he was in communication with Popham (A/G) but not in receipt of an air traffic service.

The PA28 is shown 7nm WNW of Popham, squawking 7000 without Mode C level reporting, tracking E. The PA28 pilot's written report indicated that the pilot was in the process of changing frequency from Thruxton (A/G) to Farnborough and therefore not in receipt of an Air Traffic Service at the time.

The two ac continued on their respective tracks and at 1358:40, radar recording shows them in close proximity. The PA28 is shown in the DR105's 1 o'clock at a range of 0.1nm, crossing from right to left. The written reports from the pilots indicated that both ac were at an altitude of 2200ft.

[UKAB Note 1: The incident took place between sweeps on Swanwick combined radar recording, immediately after the sweep at 1358:39 (shown above). The horizontal separation is projected as being 0 at about 1358:43; neither ac is displaying Mode C information but both show elementary Mode S].

At 1359:50, after the Airprox had occurred, the PA28 pilot contacted Farnborough LARS W and reported approaching Basingstoke at an alt of 2200ft but he did not mention the close proximity of another ac. Farnborough allocated a squawk of 0431 and agreed a BS. At that point the DR105 is shown overhead Popham and 4.5nm SW of the PA28.

Neither of the two ac was in receipt of an Air Traffic Service. CAP 774, UK Flight Information Services, Chapter 1, Page 1, Paragraph 2, states:

> 'Within Class F and G airspace, regardless of the service being provided, pilots are ultimately responsible for collision avoidance and terrain clearance, and they should consider service provision to be constrained by the unpredictable nature of this environment. The Class F and G airspace environment is typified by the following:

- It is not mandatory for a pilot to be in receipt of an ATS; this generates an unknown traffic environment;
- Controller/FISO workload cannot be predicted;
- Pilots may make sudden manoeuvres, even when in receipt of an ATS'.

The Airprox occurred when the DR105 and PA28 ac came into close proximity within Class G airspace. Neither ac was in receipt of an Air Traffic Control Service. Pilots operating in Class G airspace are ultimately responsible for collision avoidance.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available included reports from the pilots of both ac, transcripts of the relevant RT frequencies, radar recordings, reports from the air traffic controller involved and reports from the appropriate ATC authorities.

Members noted that this incident took place in a busy area of Class G airspace to the N of Popham where 'see and avoid' is the principal method of collision avoidance. Members discussed whether the PA28 pilot had routed too close to Popham but it was agreed that 3nm is reasonable, particularly if the risks are mitigated by the use of a radar service; in this case however, the pilot was attempting to establish a BS which would not have provided him with traffic information. A Member observed that the pilot may have been 'heads-in' selecting a new frequency, in which case his lookout would have been curtailed. Since the Jodel was squawking (albeit the radar recording showed, without Mode C), Members were surprised that the PA28 pilot's PCAS did not provide him with any warning of the presence of the Jodel.

It was curious that both ac reported squawking with Mode C but neither showed on the radar recording; Members agreed however, that this had not been a factor in the incident.

The Jodel pilot did see the PA28, albeit at a distance of 100m and although he dived his ac immediately, due to the short distance (time) this had probably only had a limited effect. The PA28 pilot reported first seeing the Jodel almost below, therefore too late to take avoiding action. The radar recording verified that the ac were in a 90° crossing situation with relatively low groundspeeds and, barring the constraints of the respective ac wings and canopies, they should have been visible to each other's pilot for some time. Both pilots had an equal responsibility to see and avoid other aircraft and, under the Rules of the Air the Jodel, having the PA28 on its right, should have given way to it; in the event however, the pilot did not see it so he was unable to react.

Since the separation was small, the PA28 pilot did not see the Jodel until after the CPA and the Jodel's avoidance had limited effect avoidance, the Board agreed that normally accepted safety margins had been eroded.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RISK

Cause: Effectively a non-sighting by the PA28 pilot and a late sighting by the Jodel pilot.

Degree of Risk: B.